
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- President Bush introduced Robert Gates on Wednesday afternoon as his nominee to replace Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense, saying the country needs a "fresh perspective" on Iraq.
Bush's decision to replace the Rumsfeld was another symptom to show that U.S war on Iraq was another failure like Vietnam.
The unexpected situation which was faced by American troops in Iraq made some academic scholars and politicians to compare this event with the American experience in Vietnam War (1). These analogies became more important when the architect of the U.S war in Vietnam more than 30 years ago and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer" that he has "a very uneasy feeling" that most of the same factors that damaged support for the conflict there are re-emerging in the 2-yaer-old war in Iraq. (2)
referring to the Powell Doctrine(3) ,some argue that since America's war on Iraq dose not have a "clear exit strategy" , the united states has stumbled into another overseas "quagmire" from which there is no easy or cheap exit.(4)
It is a widely accepted idea that there are no two historical events which could be perceived thoroughly alike and that is mainly due to the bias understanding of history, so reasoning through the implication of historical analogy can mislead us.
In the case of United States experience on Iraq and Vietnam one has to be very cautious in comparing two conflicts so far apart in cultural, geographical and historical circumstances. In fact, an accurate review of the evidence will show that dissimilarities between to events are more than their similarities. This is especially true when we compare the strategic and military aspects of two conflicts. It can be argued that Vietnam War was the result of American cold war foreign policies while Iraq war belongs to the era of new imperialism. In addition, the death toll in Iraq remains well short of Vietnam measures. At its peak the Vietnam War was taking five hundred U.S lives per month, and did so for many years. American troops in the battle field in Iraq only losing about a tenth that many people per month at this point. The Iraqi fighters lack a secure base of operations. They have no equivalent of North Vietnam with its regular army, or the support of a nuclear-equipped superpower like China. The Iraqi resistant fighters have no jungles to hide in. (5)
Such an emphatic judgment is not agreed by all journalist and writers. Many believe that a good number of similarities can be fined to connect American experience in Indochina to the their experience in Iraq to mention some, they argue, in domestic politics in both occasions there is a president who arrived in office with questionable legitimacy (LBJ by way of assassination, Bush by way of an electoral “victory” in which he received fewer votes than his opponent) .also both wars authorized by Congress in response to questionable, politically tainted intelligence (Gulf of Tonkin/Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destructions & al Qaeda connection) (6). Furthermore in both conflicts lack of clarity by political leaders as to the war’s purpose, justification, duration, costs, and exit strategy is the case. In addition to all these there is a disconnection between political pronouncements at home and realities on the ground, with ideology substituting for objective analysis in the generation of either overly dire or overly rosy predictions (we must stop Communism in South Vietnam or the other nations of southeast Asia will “fall like dominos”; the overthrow of Saddam Hussein will lead to a spontaneous wave of pro-US democracy-formation throughout the middle east) (7).
This article tries to examine two major aspects of political struggles of the Iraq and Vietnam War; first, United States effort to build an American style state in a region with completely different culture, and second, maintaining domestic political and social support in a prolonged war against an irregular army.
Reviewing the neo-conservatives foreign policy one can simply come to the conclusion that, United States is now seeking to do in Iraq what it failed to accomplish in Vietnam: design, form and sustain a pro- American state which not only gets the approval of Iraqi nation but also serves the U.S interests in the region.
The Republic of Vietnam was a cold war model of American state-building which for its brief and wicked twenty-year history relied entirely for its durability on American military power and economical and technical assistance .these facts made Saigon regime a politically attractive target to the communists, who questioned the legitimacy of the U.S backed government. Finally there were simply a few numbers of South Vietnamese who were ready to fight, and if needed die, to defend the non-communist political order as it was then configured. (8)
Ironically the question of illegitimate government is one of the important challenges for American politician in today's Iraq. Iraqi nation bearing the bitter memory of western colonization in mined are not willing to re-experience what has been one of the darkest parts of their history , further to that among the nations in the region Iraqis, the strong supporters of the Palestinian cause, firmly believe that it is the US policies which has made the middle east into the war zone, above all, for Muslims according to Quran any government which puts them under the authority of nonbelievers is illegitimate (GHAEDE- NAFIE –SABIL). According to these facts it is obvious that U.S policy of state-building in Iraq would not be possible through democratic ways.
The other aspect which can be discussed in relation to the comparisons between the challenges the United States faces in Iraq today and those it confronted in Vietnam is the issue of maintaining internal, political and social support in prolonged war against an irregular army.
During Vietnam War the North Vietnamese strategy of protracted war worked effectively since it correctly identified the American center of gravity as public opinion. The limited and abstract nature of U.S goals in Vietnam indicated that there were limits to the internal, political and social sustainability of the American war attempt. The lost of American life and money with no clear progress on the ground turned public opinion against war. The hard situation in the battlefield with the high dissatisfaction in home leaded to withdrawal of U.S forces and accession to a negotiated settlement that leaved South Vietnam alone with its communist foe. (9)
The outcome of recent congressional election in united states showed that U.S public and congressional tolerance levels for prolonged and inductive conflict are not what they were in 1965.the nation wide demonstrations against war in Iraq in addition to individual movement with national support such as SINDY Sheehan's are good examples to show that American public opinion has already turned against the war on Iraq.
As Paul Rogers says:
It is all; in short, eerily reminiscent of the early years of the Vietnam War. Analysts have been reluctant to draw comparisons between those early Vietnam years and
Iraq, not least because of fundamental political differences in the two conflicts. In two respects, though-continuing false optimism and the potential length of the conflict –the similarities are becoming steadily more apparent. (10)
At the end I would like to quote what Seymour Topping, San Paolo Professor Emeritus of International Journalism has said in
"Lessons of Vietnam for Iraq: On the Thirtieth Anniversary of the End of the Vietnam War";
"When the United States finally withdrew from Vietnam on April 30, 1975, it left behind chaos and rule by a despotic regime. We must hope for a better outcome after the American withdrawal from Iraq. The outcome will turn in great part on how profoundly the occupant of the White House has come to understand the history, culture, and motivations of the Iraqi people."(11)
ENDNOTES
1. Commentary on the Iraq War and its aftermath bulges with favorable and
unfavorable references to the Vietnam War analogy. See, for example, Robert
L. Bartley, “Iraq: Another Vietnam?” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2003;
Elizabeth Becker, “In the Ranks, Similarities Between Vietnam and Iraq,” New
York Times, November 2, 2003; Max Boot, “Forget Vietnam—History Defl ates
Guerrilla Mystique,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2003; Robert J. Caldwell, “Iraq is
No Vietnam,” San Diego Union-Tribune, November 9, 2003; Hank Cole, “Iraq War
Bears Resemblance to U.S. Efforts in Vietnam,” Colorado Springs Gazette, December
9, 2003; “Facts Fail to Support Iraq-Vietnam Comparisons,” USA Today, November
7, 2003; Howard Fineman, “Echoes of Vietnam Grow Louder,” Newsweek, October
29, 2003; David Gelernter, “Don’t Quit as We Did in Vietnam,” Los Angeles Times,
November 9, 2003; David Gergen, “The Fierce Urgency of Iraq,” U.S. News and World
Report, October 13, 2003; Bradley Graham, “Is Iraq Another Vietnam Quagmire?
No and Yes,” Washington Post, October 5, 2003; Richard Haloran, “Vietnam
Syndrome Resurfaces in Iraq,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 15, 2004; February 15, Victor Davis
Hanson, “Then and Now,” National Review, December 8, 2003; Seymour M. Hersh,
“Moving Targets,” New Yorker, December 15, 2003; John Hughes, “Why Iraq is
Not Like Vietnam,” Christian Science Monitor, August 27, 2003; Michael Ignatieff,
“The American Empire (Get Used to It),” New York Times Magazine, January 5,
2003; Robert G. Kaiser, “Iraq Isn’t Vietnam, But They Rhyme,” Washington Post,
December 28, 2003; James Kitfi eld, “No, It’s Not Vietnam,” National Journal,
November 22, 2003; Stanley Karnow, “Do Not Compare Iraq with Vietnam,”
Boston Globe, April 20, 2003; Richard Leiby, “Iraq Vs. Vietnam: The Scorecard,”
Washington Post, March 21, 2004; Gordon Livingston, “Iraq’s Chilling Echoes
of Vietnam,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 30, 2003; Sandra Mackey, The
Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein, New York: W. W. Norton, 2002, p.
396; John Maggs, “Too Much Like Vietnam,” National Journal, November 22, 2003;
Michael Mandelbaum, “Iraq Doesn’t Fit Vietnam Picture,” Long Island Newsday,
October 31, 2003; Dave Moniz, “Monthly Costs of Iraq, Afghan Wars Approach
that of Vietnam,” USA Today, September 8, 2003; Dave Moniz, “Some Veterans
of Vietnam See Iraq Parallel in Lack of Candor,” USA Today, November 7, 2003;
Walter Pincus, “A Quagmire? More Like a Presidential Fixation,” Washington Post,
August 31, 2003; James P. Pinkerton, “Bush’s War Strategy Looks Like a Steal of
Nixon,” Long Island Newsday, November 18, 2003; Thomas E. Ricks, “For Vietnam
Vet Anthony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory,” Washington Post, December
23, 2003; Thomas E. Ricks, “Marines to offer New Tactics in Iraq,” Washington Post,
January 7, 2004; Sally Satel, “Returning from Iraq, Still Fighting Vietnam,” New
York Times, March 5, 2004; Evan Thomas, Rod Nordlinger, and Christian Caryl,
58
“Operation Hearts and Minds,” Newsweek, December 29, 2003-January 5, 2004;
Mike Turner, “The Only Way Out is Forward,” Newsweek, September 12, 2003;
Craig R. Whitney, “Tunnel Vision: Watching Iraq, and Seeing Vietnam,” New York
Times, November 9, 2003; George C. Wilson, “Beware a Phoenix Rising from Iraq’s
Ashes,” National Journal, December 20, 2003; and George C. Wilson, “Iraq in Not
Vietnam,” National Journal, April 12, 2003.
2. http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/15/us.iraq/
3. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19921201faessay5851/colin-l-powell/u-s-forces-challenges-ahead.html
4. http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/02/pelosi_is_left_and_wrong.html
5. http://www.lies.com/wp/2003/07/06/vietnam-and-iraq-a-comparison
6. http: http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2003/06/25_zinn_specter-vn.htm
7. http://www.lies.com/wp/2003/07/06/vietnam-and-iraq-a-comparison/
8.
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00367.pdf9.
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00367.pdf10.
www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_2019.jsp11.
www.professorsemeritus.columbia.edu/topping_4.7.05.pdf